








The relationship between disclosure, information timeliness and corporate governance:  
A cross country study 
 
Wendy Beekes1, Philip Brown, Wenwen Zhan and Qiyu Zhang* 
 
This version: 31 August 2012 
 
 
*Wendy Beekes, Wenwen Zhan and Qiyu Zhang are from Lancaster University, and Philip Brown is 
from the Universities of New South Wales and Western Australia. 
 
JEL: G30; G38; M40 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Disclosure, Country Legal Origin, Timeliness of Price 
Discovery. 
 
                                                           
1 Address for correspondence: Dr Wendy Beekes, Department of Accounting and Finance, Management School, 
Lancaster University, Lancashire, LA1 4YX, UK. Email: w.beekes@lancaster.ac.uk.  Tel: 44 (0) 1524 593623.  




We would like to thank seminar participants at Lancaster University Management School seminar series, in 
particular Martin Conyon, Bart Lambrecht, Kwok Tong Soo, Ken Peasnell and Steve Young and participants at 
the University of York seminar series, in particular Annie Wei for useful comments.  We would also like to 
thank participants at the 10th International Conference on Corporate Governance at the University of 
Birmingham for comments received. Swarnodeep Homroy and Peiran Shi provided valuable research assistance. 
The authors would also like to acknowledge funding from the Leverhulme Trust (Grant reference: F/00 185/W - 










The relationship between disclosure, information timeliness and corporate governance:  





We examine the link between corporate governance, and the level of firms’ disclosures and 
timeliness of price discovery in a cross-country study of the period 2003 to 2008.  Our results 
confirm better-governed firms make more announcements to the market.  We also find 
different levels of disclosure between common and civil law countries, with firms with better 
governance in common law countries being associated with greater disclosure.  Our 
timeliness of prices results suggest better governance is associated with less timely reflection 
of a firm’s performance information in share prices.  This would suggest corporate 
governance is a substitute rather than a complement with respect to corporate transparency.  
These results lead us to the conclusion that even if more information is disclosed by better-













There has been an increased emphasis on firm’s Corporate Governance (CG) and firm 
disclosure post the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom.  Corporate transparency has 
an important role to play in overcoming agency problems and information asymmetries 
between owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  CG has an important influence 
on managers’ decision making processes and can help align managers’ objectives and actions 
with shareholders’ best interests through increased monitoring of managers’ actions.  For 
example, prior research has shown CG can reduce the propensity for earnings management in 
a firm (Beasley, 1996), and increase the frequency of disclosures frequency and the speed of 
price discovery (Beekes and Brown, 2006).   
 
This study specifically focuses on the information flows from the firm to market participants 
by examining the release of information via company announcements to the stock market, 
with the expectation that CG positively influences the level and informativeness of 
disclosure.  In addition, since the information from firms with ‘better’ CG is potentially more 
credible, we expect it to be traded upon quickly and reflected in share prices on a more timely 
basis relative to other firms. 2  To investigate this we use a measure of the timeliness of price 
discovery which examines how quickly performance information relating to the annual 
earnings announcement is incorporated into share prices throughout the year.  In addition to 
examining the role of CG structures internal to the organisation (such as board independence 
and audit quality), we also investigate the impact of two external measures, namely family 
ownership and block holdings by institutional investors on firm level disclosure and 
timeliness. 
 
Our study uses the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) dataset to measure CG in 
developed countries.  This dataset encompasses a variety of measures for  
CG that are important for effective CG according to prior research or are incorporated into 
governance guidance, such as the size and composition of the board of directors and its 
committees, the external auditor and the balance between audit and non-audit fees paid to the 
auditor.  We use the ISS data in a comparable manner to prior studies (e.g. Aggarwal, Erel, 
Stulz and Williamson 2010; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos, 2011), making a summative 
composite index of seven governance aspects captured by the dataset.  We also examine two 
                                                           
2 By ‘better’ CG we are referring to the firm achieving a higher rating according to our measure of CG. 
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sub-indices focused on the audit quality of the firm and the quality of its board (as in Yu, 
2011), which are expected to enhance disclosure and timeliness of information discovery in 
prices.   
 
Using estimation methods which control for potential endogeneity in CG and ownership, we 
find that better-governed firms release more information to the market, as proxied by the 
number of announcements made to the stock exchange over the financial year.  We find no 
statistically reliable effect for the level of family ownership or block-holding by institutional 
investors.  Although better CG results in greater disclosure for firms in all countries included 
in our sample, our results by legal origin suggest individual firm-level CG has a greater 
influence on disclosures in common law countries.  The results for timeliness of price 
discovery suggest there is a substitution relationship between CG and timeliness, i.e. firms 
with better CG are associated with less timely price discovery.  Our results are robust to a 
number of alternative specifications. 
 
We contribute to a growing literature on CG and disclosure, by providing firm-level and 
county-level evidence on the frequency and timeliness of disclosure.  Our paper is related to 
the cross-country study completed by Yu (2011), who investigates stock price 
informativeness by evaluating stock return variation and earnings response coefficients. We 
specifically examine the level of disclosure as proxied by the number of announcements 
made to the stock exchange and the timeliness of information discovery in prices.  Our results 
suggest greater overall disclosure levels are not matched by timeliness in better-governed 
firms, which is contrary to Yu’s finding which suggests there is greater informativeness for 
better-governed firms.  In addition to evaluating our results at the individual firm level, we 
specifically relate our results to a country’s legal origin, thereby contributing to the debate 
regarding the relevance of CG at the country level and the role of investor protection.  
Second, we specifically control for endogeneity in our approach as disclosure and CG, and 
timeliness and CG, may be jointly determined.  Our results suggest that for many models, 
endogeneity is not a significant concern. 
 
The next section discusses the motivation and hypotheses to be tested in our study.  Section 3 
examines the data, and the research method used in this study.  Section 4 discusses the results 
from the document count models and section 5 discusses the results from the timeliness of 




2. Motivation and Hypothesis 
2.1 Corporate Governance, Ownership and Disclosure Frequency 
We examine two major research questions. First, what is the benefit of CG to investors in 
terms of information transparency and disclosure?  Do better-governed firms release more 
information and is this information incorporated into prices on a timelier basis. Second, how 
does this CG effect differ by country?  We examine these questions on a cross-country basis 
using the ISS dataset to measure CG in developed countries.  Following Aggarwal et al. 
(2011), we use an aggregate measure of CG which takes seven aspects of CG into account, 
focussing on the structure of the board and the audit quality, as well as the capital structure of 
the firm.  In addition, in sensitivity analysis, following Yu (2011) we also use two sub-
indices, Audit and Board which evaluate the board and audit quality separately.  We believe 
both of these aspects should affect the level and timeliness of firm disclosures to the market. 
 
The need for firm disclosure arises from a fundamental agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and firms’ desire to signal their quality to current and potential investors 
(Akerlof, 1970).  Firm disclosures are a crucial feature of an efficient capital market and they 
occur even in the absence of stock market legislation that encourages continuous disclosure 
of price relevant information to keep the market informed.  Disclosures to the market are 
important and enable investors and creditors to obtain a better understanding of the firm’s 
activities thereby reducing agency costs.  Firms’ incentives to volunteer information are well 
researched.  For example, prior research has found larger firms disclose more information 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1993), as do firms with superior performance (Lev and Penman, 1990).  
In addition, there could be incentives to disclose information to reduce the cost of equity 
capital (Botosan, 1997) or alternatively to reduce the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998).  
Managers may also have opportunistic incentives to disclose information to enhance the 
value of their shares or option awards (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) or protect themselves 
against potential litigation when they become aware of bad news (Skinner, 1994).  Disclosure 
may also be a function of the growth opportunities of the firm as firms engaging in more 
research and development may be less keen to disclose information about product 
developments for proprietary cost reasons (Core, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983).  Disclosure of 
course is not costless; it can have major cost implications for the firm, although as alluded to 




Prior evidence has shown the importance of CG for managers’ decision making.  Fama 
(1980) indicates that the board of directors has a vital role to play in monitoring managers’ 
actions and the outcomes.  Outside directors are associated with better earnings quality and 
lower amounts of financial fraud (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996 and Beasley, 1996).  In 
addition to monitoring the quality of reported earnings, outside directors may be able to 
positively influence firm disclosure levels, e.g. via the issuance of management earnings 
forecasts (Ajinkya, Bhoraj and Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and 
encourage more timely release of information (Sengupta, 2004). Beekes and Brown (2006) 
find better-governed Australian firms make more disclosures to the market and their earnings 
performance is reflected in stock prices on a more timely basis compared with other firms.  
Also the presence of external block holdings by institutional investors may create additional 
incentives for disclosure (Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999).  For these reasons CG may 
positively influence disclosure.  
 
However CG comprises a number of difference elements and there may be a substitution 
relationship between the various aspects of CG and disclosure.  For example, Leung and 
Horwitz (2004) find outside directors are effective at increasing firm disclosure, but only in 
instances when managerial ownership was also at low levels.  Also, firms with better CG may 
feel a lesser need to disclose information to the market due to the greater monitoring of 
management in place (Eng and Mak, 2003).  Although outside directors may be perceived to 
be helping to monitor managers and to promote greater disclosure, in some instances they 
may be ineffective in their role due to allegiance to management, a lack of experience or 
because board dynamics may prevent them from performing their duties effectively.  
Therefore the presence of outside directors on the board of directors in itself does not 
guarantee that disclosure is any greater, especially if there are other dominant parties on the 
board of directors, such as representation from group companies or main bank representatives 
as in Japan (Douthett and Jung, 2001).   
 
In addition to examining the structures of CG, our study also incorporates the firm’s 
ownership structure; specifically the level of family and institutional ownership.  Individual 
countries have very different ownership structures. La Porta et al. (1998) for example report 
many countries have concentrated ownership and this may be through other firms or family 
share holdings.   Some countries in our sample (for example, Japan and Canada) have firms 
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with a large proportion of closely held shares. In Japan this is likely due to the influence of 
main banks and corporate groupings through keiretsu (Kang and Shivdasani, 1999) and in 
Canada through family connections (Ben-Amar and André, 2006). Such firms are considered 
to be controlled by insiders and may prefer to retain information within the organisation, 
rather than encouraging the dissemination of information to external parties.  This secretive 
approach could enable the dominant shareholders to expropriate wealth from the minority 
shareholders in the firm.  However, prior evidence suggests although family dominated firms 
provide fewer disclosures in terms of conference calls and earnings forecasts, they do provide 
more earnings warnings for fear of litigation from other shareholders when there is ‘bad’ 
news (Chen, Chen, Cheng, 2008).  Therefore the undiversified nature of the shareholdings of 
family firms may result in greater disclosure and may even be beneficial as it may enable 
them to have a lower cost of capital (Botosan, 1997).  The influence of family ownership on 
disclosure is therefore by no means clear from prior empirical work and we leave it as an 
open question in our study. 
 
In addition to family ownership, external ownership and monitoring provided by institutional 
investors can influence firm disclosure.  Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) find firms that 
increase their disclosure are associated with greater institutional ownership.  Ajinkya, Bhoraj 
and Sengupta (2005) find firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue 
management forecasts and managers are much more conservative (i.e. less optimistic) in their 
earnings forecasts where there is higher institutional ownership.  However, the impact of 
institutional ownership will depend upon the level of ownership concentration of institutional 
ownership as this will inevitably influence the desirability for firms to disclose information to 
other parties.  Consistent with this argument, Ajinkya, Bhoraj and Sengupta (2005) find 
concentrated block ownership is negatively associated with disclosure.  Therefore it is 
unclear whether institutional ownership will have a complementary or substitution role in 
firms’ disclosure practices. 
 
Our basic prediction is monitoring provided by CG will result in greater firm disclosure: 
H1A: There is a positive association between CG quality and disclosure frequency.   
However the evidence for the influence of family ownership on disclosure, and the presence 
of institutional ownership, is mixed.  For this reason we make no prediction for the 




In addition to examining evidence at the individual firm level, we are also interested in cross-
country differences and in particular differences by legal origin of the countries included in 
our sample.  Shareholders are an important source of finance but investors demand protection 
of their investment and stewardship of the resources in the company in which they have 
invested.  Prior evidence shows investor protection varies across countries (La Porta et al., 
1998).  As investor rights increase, it is likely that shareholders will demand additional 
information from companies in which they have invested.  It is also more likely that any 
mandatory requirements for disclosure will be enforced in countries where investor rights are 
higher.  Based on prior evidence (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000) 
we expect that disclosure and firm transparency will be greater in common law countries 
because of their stronger protection of investor rights.  This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H1B: There is a positive association between disclosure frequency in common law 
countries. 
However we expect that better CG will provide incentives for greater disclosure in both civil 
and common law countries, although the magnitude of disclosure is likely to be greater in 
common law countries due to  their greater investor protection, which leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
H1C: The positive association between CG and disclosure is greater in common law 
than civil law countries. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance, Ownership and the Timeliness of Price Discovery 
The timeliness of information is important to ensure current and potential investors are kept 
informed of current views (and changes to prior views made public) on future performance.  
What matters to decision makers is not only the quantum of credible information that is 
disclosed, but also the timeliness and relevance of the disclosures.  We would predict, as 
regulators have opined in Australia and Canada for example, that better-governed firms 
release information on a more timely basis and the information they release is “balanced”, i.e. 
good and bad news are disclosed on the same basis (Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003; Toronto Stock Exchange, 2004).  Obviously managers may have 
incentives to opportunistically time the release of favourable information, such as when they 
can control the flow of information to enhance their wealth through grants of stock options.  
However, there could also be incentives to accelerate the timeliness of bad news:  Skinner 
(1994) suggests managers may release more bad news to limit the risk of costly shareholder 




In this study we focus on the flow of information to the market up to the time of the 
company’s annual earnings release; and we assess the speed with which that information is 
integrated into share prices.  The genesis of our approach is found in Ball and Brown (1968), 
who acknowledge that most of the information relating to the annual earnings announcement 
is incorporated into the share price well in advance of the annual earnings release date.3  
Beekes and Brown (2006) find firms with better CG in Australia have more timely price 
discovery (i.e. their share prices reflect the information relating to annual performance more 
quickly than other firms).   Based upon this evidence, we expect that firms with better CG 
will be associated with more timely price discovery.  We predict the following:   
H2A: Price discovery is faster (more timely) for firms with better CG.  
Firms with more insider involvement, such as family controlled companies may prefer to 
keep the information within the organisation.  Also family ownership may result in firms not 
wishing to disclose information to minority shareholders on a timely basis as the investment 
horizons of family shareholders tend to be longer than other investors (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003).  Therefore firms with greater family ownership may be associated with less timely 
price discovery, especially as family owners are likely to be more integrally involved in the 
business, resulting in lower information asymmetry between the family and managers.  
Therefore the monitoring which would arise from this close relationship may reduce the 
necessity for timely disclosure, implying family ownership would be associated with lower 
disclosure timeliness.  On the other hand, family controlled companies may wish to be 
perceived as being transparent in an effort to ensure continuity of the firm, as they have much 
to lose if the firm fails, given their investments of human capital and other wealth in the 
business.  Prior evidence has shown that disclosure on a timely basis may pre-empt litigation 
(Skinner, 1994).  Given the non-diversified nature of the family share holding, we may 
expect firms to take a more conservative view and release information on a timely basis.  
Therefore timeliness may not be detrimentally affected by the presence of family ownership.  
We leave this as another open question in our study. 
 
We also investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and the timeliness of 
price discovery.  Institutional investors are considered effective monitors of firm behaviour 
and are associated with greater disclosure (Bushee and Noe, 2000).  However, in some 
                                                           
3  Ball and Brown (1968) differentiate between “Total Information”, “Net Information” and “Accounting 
Information”.  Our focus is on what they define as Net Information. 
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countries (e.g. Japan) institutional ownership is just beginning to be a significant part of 
firms’ ownership structures; and, arguably, institutions have not yet been as effective in Japan 
as in other countries when it comes to their ability to monitor managers effectively and to 
encourage greater transparency (Jacoby, 2007). On the other hand, rather than increasing 
disclosure timeliness, institutional block holdings may be associated with a desire to keep 
information within the organisation so that if information is released, it may be less timely.  
Therefore we also leave how institutional ownership affects the timeliness of price discovery 
as an open question. 
 
For firms in common law countries we would expect greater disclosure and transparency, as 
discussed earlier.  Therefore we would expect this to flow through to the timeliness of price 
discovery, so overall timeliness is greater in common law countries.  We still anticipate CG 
will have an impact on the timeliness of prices in civil law countries, but we anticipate the 
magnitude of the effect will be higher in common law countries as firms with better CG try to 
differentiate themselves from other firms. 
H2B: There is greater timeliness of price discovery in common law countries than civil 
law countries.  
H2C: The incremental effect of CG on timeliness is greater (i.e. better-governed firms 
are more timely) in common law countries relative to civil law countries. 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Sample selection and description 
Our study uses two distinct datasets in the analysis of the link between CG and disclosure 
frequency, and timeliness: (i) document counts, and (ii) the timeliness of price discovery.  
Both datasets use annual firm-level data, but the country coverage differs between the two 
samples due to data availability.  The document count dataset contains data from nineteen 
countries as we were unable to source reliable company announcement (document) data for 
Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and USA and so these countries are excluded 
from the final document count dataset.  The timeliness dataset contains data for all twenty-
four countries covered by our CG dataset (outlined below). Our sample time period is 1 
January 2003 to 31 December 2008, although for some countries we do not have complete 
data for the full time period available to us.  Panel A of Tables 1 and 5 show the country-year 




Our primary sample consists of the firms covered by the ISS database which is used for our 
measure of CG.  This dataset has two distinct advantages over other CG datasets.  First, it 
covers data in a variety of developed countries thereby enabling us to examine the relation 
between country characteristics and CG. 4  Second, firms covered in the dataset are generally 
larger firms which are likely to be more important in their respective countries and to attract 
more interest from institutional investors and analysts.  Rather than using the metric 
calculated by ISS, the usefulness of which has been questioned in the literature (Daines, Gow 
and Larcker, 2010), we use the underlying CG data to generate an index of CG, as explained 
below. 
 
3.1.1 Firm Level Corporate Governance and Ownership 
Following prior research (Aggarwal et al. 2011) we use a parsimonious individual firm 
measure of CG which takes seven unique governance characteristics that are common to the 
ISS USA and Global (non-USA) datasets.  Although ISS has daily files for CG data, our 
initial analysis shows many items remain unchanged throughout the year.  For this reason, we 
measure CG as at 31 December each year for every firm in our sample and this data is 
matched to the firm’s financial data drawn from the firm’s financial statements of the same 
year.  To determine a firm’s CG rating, ISS collects CG data from publicly available 
company disclosure documents such as the annual report and regulatory filings, and the 
company CG profile is updated each time shareholders meet (ISS, 2003).  The sample 
coverage differs significantly between the USA and Global datasets: the USA dataset covers 
a much larger sample of firms compared with the Global dataset.  USA firms are covered by 
ISS if they appear in any of the following indices: Standard and Poors (S&P) 500, S&P Mid-
Cap 400, S&P Small-Cap 600, Russell 3000 (ISS, 2005). This criterion results in more firms 
being covered and a greater diversity in terms of firm size for the USA sample.  Only larger 
firms are included in the Global dataset (i.e. non-USA countries); specifically firms listed on 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International Europe, Australasia, and Far East (MSCI EAFE) 
index and for Canada, firms listed on S&P’s Composite index of the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(ISS, 2003).5   
                                                           
4 Country coverage of the ISS datasets is as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.  Although more countries are covered by 
the database over time, the relatively small number of observations per annum for some countries results in 
them being excluded from our study. 
5 We address this in our results estimation by excluding the countries for which there is a greater proportion of 




ISS CG data are recorded in such a way that firms meeting ‘minimum standards’ of 
governance (as specified by ISS) are identified and this is done on a comparative basis across 
all countries covered by the dataset. We adopt a simple additive rule to construct a 
governance index from these items (as in Gompers et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011).  The 
firm scores one point for each characteristic successfully met and zero otherwise. The sum of 
the scores is simply divided by seven and recorded in the form of a percentage score.6  We 
acknowledge that such a straight-forward approach has been criticised in the literature and, in 
response, several studies have sought to identify the key aspects of CG (e.g. Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell, 2009; Daines Gow and Larcker, 2010; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007).  
The seven CG characteristics included in our index are shown in Appendix A.7  This measure 
of CG includes the assessment of the independence and size of the board of directors, the 
separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman, composition of the audit committee 
membership, and the presence of more than one class of share capital.   
 
The ISS dataset focuses on the internal structures of governance of firms (e.g. board and 
board committees) and does not specifically examine ownership structures.  To enable 
ownership structure to be included in our study, we use data on the percentage of family 
ownership and the percentage of institutional block holdings (we aggregate holdings of at 
least five per cent ), sourced from OSIRIS.8   
  
 
3.1.2 Other data sources 
Variable definitions and sources of data are included in the Appendix.  Data for company 
announcements (document counts) are sourced directly from stock exchanges wherever 
possible (e.g. the Australian Securities Exchange, Hong Kong Exchange, Irish Stock 
Exchange), but for some countries alternative sources were used as the data were unavailable 
from the stock exchange directly, such as Perfect Information for the UK.  We obtain all 
share-related data (share price, returns, number of shares outstanding, market index returns) 
from Datastream for Global companies and the Center for Research in Security Prices 
                                                           
6 In sensitivity analysis, we test the robustness of our results to other measures of aggregate CG used in the 
literature. 
7 In constructing the variables, if the item is missing in the current year, we forward fill it with the previous 
year’s value to maximise the potential number of observations in our sample, as in Aggarwal et al. (2011). 
8 In sensitivity analysis we also use a measure of close ownership from Worldscope that includes ownership by 
family, directors and individuals holding more than 5% of issued share capital. 
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(CRSP) for USA companies.   The date of the annual earnings release which is used in both 
our datasets is taken from a variety of sources to maximise the sample coverage. We obtain 
announcement dates from Bloomberg, Reuters, Compustat, Compustat Global, Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and Worldscope.  Where we have more than one source 
of data for the annual earnings release date for a particular firm year, we take the earliest 
plausible date which we deem to be at least two weeks but not more than six months after the 
financial year end to reduce the number of potentially erroneous dates.  Firm-level accounting 
data are taken from Worldscope for Global companies and Compustat for USA companies.  
Data for cross-listing on a USA stock exchange are identified from the Bank of New York, 
US Stock exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Industry is defined by 
the 10 Standard & Poors Global Sector Classification (GIC) groups.  We use La Porta et al. 
(1998) to determine whether a particular country has a common or civil law origin.  To 
reduce the influence of outliers, we winzorise continuous firm-level variables at the 1% and 
99% levels.   
 
3.2 Measuring disclosure and information transparency 
We examine two particular aspects relating to disclosure and transparency.  First, we examine 
the level of disclosure frequency as proxied by the individual firm announcements made to 
the stock exchange over the year (hereafter termed ‘documents’).  Second, we examine the 
timeliness of price discovery, using a measure that summarises how quickly value relevant 
information became known to the market and was reflected in share prices over the 365 days 
ending 14 days after the firm announced its results for the year. Both aspects are explained in 
more detail in following sections.   
 
3.2.1 Frequency of Disclosure  
To measure the association of CG and disclosure frequency, we focus on the number of 
documents the firm releases to the stock market over the year.  We also impose the criteria 
that firms must make at least five announcements during the year to be included in the 
sample.  Our dependent variable is the log of the number of the documents released over a 
365 day period ending two weeks after the firm’s annual earnings release date.   This period 
will enable us to capture all documents released throughout the year and the documents 
relating to the annual earnings performance which, since Ball and Brown (1968) has been 
recognised as a potentially important value relevant event for the firm.  We test the impact of 
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Where: Gov7 is a measure of corporate governance which ranges between 0 and 1 and is 
increasing in governance quality (see Appendix A for further details), Family is the 
percentage of shares held in the firm by family members, Instown is the percentage of block 
institutional block ownership in the firm, Size is firm size proxied by the log of market 
capitalisation, Leverage is measured as total debt divided by total assets, Volatility is 
calculated from daily log returns in the 90 days prior to the first day of the measurement 
period for the document count, Good news is a dummy variable equal to one if share 
performance is above the market over the year, and zero otherwise, Crosslist is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is cross listed on a US exchange and zero otherwise, 
Common is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is domiciled in a country of common 
law origin and zero otherwise, and Common·Gov7, Common·Family and  Common·Instown 
are interaction terms.  i indexes the firm, t indexes the year, j indexes the country, and k 
indexes the industry sector. -.  is a vector of country indicators, /0  is a vector of sector 
indicators, 1 is a vector of year indicators,  2.  is a vector of country-year indicators and 30 
is a vector of sector-year indicators.   
 
The four models estimated in this paper for the document counts are nested in Eq. (1) above.  
The primary focus of Eq. (1) is the voluntary level of disclosure for better-governed firms, 
since mandatory disclosure levels are captured by the intercept.  We predict better-governed 
firms release more information relative to other firms; i.e. β

 is positive (H1A), although we 
have no clear prediction for the impact of family or institutional ownership.  Given better 
investor protection in common law countries, we would expect common law countries to be 
associated with greater overall disclosure, which would be reflected in a positive coefficient 
on +.  While we expect CG will impact on disclosure in all countries irrespective of their 
legal origin, we expect there is incrementally greater disclosure by better-governed firms in 
common law countries, which would be reflected in a positive coefficient on . In our first 
model estimation, we focus on CG measured by Gov7 and omit variables designed to capture 
the effects of different ownership structures (Family and Instown) and legal origin.  The two 
ownership variables are then included in the next specification as in Eq. (1).  In the third and 
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fourth models we include variables for legal origin and interactions with governance (model 
3) and ownership (model 4). 
The model uses several additional independent variables identified from prior research to 
control for other possible determinants of document disclosures.  First, we include firm size 
to control for the positive association observed between disclosure and size (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993).  Leverage is included as more highly levered firms are more risky and 
therefore may be under greater scrutiny, and may be prompted to release more information to 
the market as a consequence.  Stock return Volatility is included to proxy for the notion that 
greater volatility in performance could result in additional disclosures due to investors’ 
greater demand for information.  In addition, Goodnews is included to control for the positive 
association observed between disclosure and firm performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Lev and Penman, 1990).  We control for a firm’s cross listing (Crosslist) on a US exchange 
via level II or level III American Depository Receipts (ADRs), which require the firm to file 
a Form 20-F with the US S.E.C. (Durand and Tarca, 2005), to meet the greater reporting 
requirements of US exchanges, and to satisfy the greater protection requirements for minority 
investors in the US (Coffee, 2002; Doidge, 2004).  We control for industry using the 10 S&P 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors as we anticipate some firms may have 
lower incentives for disclosure due to their greater proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983), 
especially in sectors with large research and development expenditures, such as health care or 
information technology.  Our models also control for year, country, country-year and sector-
year effects. 
We include country-year effects to control for the variation in year for that particular country 
rather than including a set of country level variables in our model.  Similarly we include 
controls for sector-year, as there will inevitably be some developments which affect the 
sector as a whole.  This would appear to be a more efficient method of capturing variation 
because many data items for country-level effects do not vary significantly over time, and it 
is also problematic to determine exactly which variables should or should not be included 
given the variation in our sample.   
   
3.2.2  Timeliness of Price Discovery 
To examine the timeliness of information discovery about a firm’s performance, we use the 
metric developed in Beekes and Brown (2006).  This metric examines ‘timeliness’ at the 
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individual firm level and is based upon the concept introduced by Ball and Brown (1968).  
The measure focuses upon the annual earnings release for the firm as this is an important, 
regular event for all firms and is expected to be price relevant.  We know from prior research 
that much of the information included in the firm’s annual earnings announcement is 
anticipated by the market well in advance of the annual earnings announcement after the 
firm’s financial year end.  The timeliness of price discovery measure examines the impact of 
all value relevant information on the individual firm’s share price during the year ending 14 
days after the announcement of the firm’s earnings for the year, which allows the price to 
settle following the annual earnings announcement.  Specifically, Timeliness, is defined as: 
4#	# 




     (2) 
where: tP  is the daily market-adjusted share price; and day 0 is 14 days after the 
announcement date. 
We compare ‘timeliness’ across firms; i.e. how quickly the firm reaches the terminal price on 
day 0.  The intuition behind this model is as follows.  If a firm releases all value relevant 
information on day t = -365, the share price moves to P0.   And if for the remaining 364 days 
no further price relevant information is released and the share price tracks the market index 
until day t = 0, then beyond that included on the first day, there was no further value relevant 
information incorporated into prices.  This example describes a firm releasing value relevant 
information on an extremely timely basis, i.e. all on day one. In this instance, the speed of 
adjustment is at the maximum level possible and the timeliness metric is near zero.  At the 
other extreme, a firm may have a share price which tracks the market index until the last day 
of the year, when it moves to P0.  In this case, price discovery is extremely slow and the 
metric will be close to one.  This measure focuses solely on pricing outcomes and pays no 
attention to the method by which price discovery actually occurs. Timeliness so defined is 
affected by the level of volatility in individual share prices in that greater volatility tends to 
inflate the timeliness metric.  To take account of this tendency, as Beekes and Brown (2006) 
we deflate the raw timeliness metric by one plus the absolute return over the period for which 
timeliness is calculated and denote the result ‘Timeliness Deflated’.   
 
The model used to investigate the timeliness of price discovery is: 
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where the variables are as previously defined.   
 
Our predictions are as follows. We expect price discovery for better-governed firms to be 
more timely, as reflected in a negative coefficient on β

 to (H2A).  We expect common law 
firms also to have greater timeliness, as reflected in a negative coefficient on Common (β
*
).  
We examine the incremental impact of CG in common law countries and further expect 
better-governed firms in common law countries to be more timely, as reflected in a negative 





For comparison purposes, the results tables in this paper also show the pooled cross-section 
and time series Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression methods with standard errors robust 
to the presence of heteroskedasticity.  In addition, all standard errors are clustered by the 
individual firm.  However, to acknowledge the possible endogenous relationship between CG 
and disclosure, and CG and timeliness, we use the 2-step Generalized Method of Moments 
(2-GMM) estimation methods robust to heteroskedasticity, with the standard errors clustered 
by firm.   
 
The 2-GMM method controls for endogeneity in CG (and ownership) and requires the 
selection of appropriate instruments.  To enable this method to work effectively, the 
instrument chosen must be contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error, but highly 
correlated with the regressor for which it serves as an instrument (Kennedy, 2003, p.159).  
Selecting an appropriate instrument for CG is not without challenge.  Although some 
researchers have used prior year CG as an instrument for current year CG, this is likely to be 
inappropriate given the inertia in governance structures in adjacent years (Brown, Beekes and 
Verhoeven, 2011).  We instead use two instruments for firm CG in our models: average 
sector level of CG and the average country level of CG, in both cases excluding the 
observation in question from the calculation.   The industry and country level CG provide a 
benchmark of quality which firms may seek to achieve.  These instruments are chosen 
because we do not expect a direct relationship between the error term in our models and the 
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average industry CG or the average country CG, although we expect there to be similar CG 
expectations for firms in the same industry and in the same country.  For the share ownership 
variables, family ownership (Family) and block institutional share ownership (Instown), we 
use the average country and industry sector as instruments, for similar reasons. 
 
We use the Hansen J-test to check the validity of instruments used in our estimations where a 
rejection of the null hypothesis casts doubt on validity.  In addition, we also test for 
underidentification, i.e. whether our instruments are correlated with the endogenous CG 
variables, using the LM Kleibergen-Papp χ2 test where the null hypothesis is that the model is 
underidentified (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007).  We also include the F-statistic from a 
test of the excluded instruments in the first stage regressions to provide further assurance that 
the instruments are valid.  The results from these tests are routinely reported in our results 
tables.  We find that the chosen instruments are robust in the majority of cases.   
 
4. Document Count Models 
4.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, panel A shows the number of observations by country and year and mean values of 
our CG variables by country.  We include nineteen countries in our dataset for the period 
2003 – 2008 where we could obtain all necessary data.  For five countries (France, Japan, 
Portugal, Singapore, South Korea) we were unable to obtain complete data for all years 
covered by our study, as indicated in the table.  Our final sample includes 8,042 firm-year 
observations relating to 2,145 unique firms.  It is noticeable that this sample has a large 
proportion of companies from Japan and the UK (25 and 28 per cent respectively) and we 
will consider the implications later in our analysis.  The average firm in our sample meets 62 
per cent of the CG requirements as measured by Gov7.  Japan has the lowest overall CG 
rating on average (Gov7 mean = 0.4) perhaps due to the existence of large boards of directors 
and a lack of independent board membership (Uchida, 2011), whereas Canada has the highest 
(Gov7 mean = 0.87) despite the large proportion of family ownership in Canada.  With regard 
to audit and board quality, the average firm meets 58 per cent of the governance criteria for 
both aspects.   
 




Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample by legal origin and year, and the 
mean CG values by legal origin.  Fifty-four per cent of observations arise from common law 
countries.  Tests of the differences in means for all measures of CG classified by legal origin 
reveal significantly greater levels in common law countries (p < 0.001).  Panel C shows the 
sample distribution by industry sector and year, and the mean CG values by industry sector.  
We made a conscious decision to include all sectors in our study and to use sector specific 
indicator variables in pooled cross section and time series Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimations.9   In our sample, 20 per cent of observations are from the Industrials sector, 18 
per cent each from Consumer Discretionary and Financials, 12 per cent from the Materials 
sector and 10 percent from Information Technology.  Other sectors each comprise less than 
10 per cent of the sample. Companies from the Energy sector have the highest average 
aggregate CG in our sample (Gov7 mean = 0.73), perhaps due to closer regulatory scrutiny of 
these companies which include mining and resource companies.  The lowest aggregate CG is 
in the Information Technology sector (Gov7 mean = 0.59), which may be due to the demand 
for more executive board members with substantial technical knowledge both to participate in 
board-level decisions and to protect the firm’s intellectual capital. 
Table 2 shows the mean values of the variables used in the document count models 
(excluding CG which was included in Table 1).  The left hand panel (columns 1-8) relates to 
the full sample of observations (N=8,042) and the right hand side (columns 9-11) provides 
information on ownership variables (N=5,051) where we are able to obtain matching 
ownership data for our main sample from OSIRIS.  The mean number of documents per year 
(Doc Count) is 82 which equates to roughly two documents per week on average.  It is 
noticeable that Australia has the greatest number of documents per year, whereas Italy has the 
fewest. 10   Just under half of the observations in our sample relate to years when firm 
performance was above the market level (Goodnews).   
 
XX TABLE 2 XX 
                                                           
9 Many corporate governance studies exclude the financials and utilities sectors from their sample due to the 
differing regulations imposed on these sectors.  To take account of this in sensitivity analysis, we exclude the 
financials and utilities sectors, re-estimate the results and reach similar conclusions. 
10 For Italy we were only able to obtain data on company reports, rather than company announcements as is the 




Examining the values by legal origin in Table 2 panel B, we find a statistically greater 
average disclosure quantity (Doc Count) in common law compared with civil law countries  
(p <0.001).  With regard to ownership structures, there is a statistically significant greater 
level of family and institutional ownership (Instown) in common law compared with civil law 
countries (p <0.001).  In panel C we show the mean values of variables by sector.  Firms in 
the Financials and Energy sectors release more documents on average than firms in other 
sectors.   
Variable correlations (not tabulated) show Gov7 is positively correlated with the other 
measures of CG used (Audit and Board) at r=0.69 or better.  Gov7 is positively correlated 
with the log of the number of documents released (Ldocs) (r = 0.37) with cross listing (r = 
0.25), consistent with cross listed firms being associated with better CG when they cross list 
on a USA stock exchange.   
 
4.2 Results for Document Count Models 
Table 3 shows the relation between CG, ownership and the quantity of disclosure as proxied 
by the natural log of the number of company announcements released to the stock market 
(Ldocs).  Recall from our hypothesis H1A we expect better-governed firms to release more 
information to the stock market, as reflected in a positive coefficient on Gov7.  Consistent 
with our prediction and evidence from Australia (Beekes and Brown, 2006), when we 
estimate our model for all countries in our sample by OLS methods, we find CG has a 
positive association between CG and disclosure (column 1, Table 3).  Inclusion of variables 
for firms’ ownership structure (Instown and Family) reduces the sample size to 5,051 
observations, but we continue to find this main result for Gov7 (column 2, Table 3).  Block 
institutional ownership (Instown) has no significant influence on disclosure levels, but family 
share ownership (Family) results in fewer disclosures.   Therefore better-governed firms 
release more information, but firms with greater levels of family ownership are more likely to 
retain the information within the firm.   
 
XX TABLE 3 XX 
 
Controlling for endogeneity using the two-step Generalised Method of Moments estimation 
method (2-GMM), we find comparable results for Gov7, but Family is no longer statistically 
significant (column 4, Table 3). Results from the Hansen’s J-test suggest our chosen 
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instruments in these models are relatively robust and endogeneity is a concern in the model 
that includes the ownership variables, suggesting 2-GMM results are appropriate in this 
instance.  The results on control variables are mostly consistent with our expectations: larger 
firms, firms with more leverage, firms with greater volatility in performance and firms which 
are cross-listed tend to make more frequent disclosures.  Interestingly contrary to some prior 
evidence from (Lev and Penman, 1990), firms with better than average performance 
(Goodnews) release fewer documents, suggesting a conservative approach to disclosure 
policy when there is good news.   
 
We also obtain results including a dummy variable for legal origin, Common; they are 
reported in Table 4.  Results in columns 1 and 2 are estimated by OLS and results in columns 
3 and 4 are estimated by 2-GMM for all countries in our sample.  In column 1, we observe 
that Gov7 has a positive association with disclosure, and although the interaction term 
Common·Gov7 (which captures the incremental effect for better-governed firms in common 
law countries) is positive, it is not significant.  This suggests that better-governed firms in 
common law countries do not release significantly more documents than better-governed 
firms in civil law countries.  Therefore firms with better CG are inclined to release greater 
amounts of information to the market to indicate their transparency to investors irrespective 
of their country’s legal origin.  However, the overall level of disclosure for all firms in 
common law countries is greater as reflected in the significant and positive coefficient on 
Common.  Including the ownership variables and interacting these with the dummy variable 
for legal origin, Common, we find significant results for the level of disclosure by better-
governed firms in common law countries and also incrementally lower disclosure by firms 
with greater family ownership in common law countries (Common·Family, column 2).  There 
are no significant results for the level of block institutional ownership (Instown).  Other 
variables are similar in magnitude and have the same sign as previously reported.  
Comparable results are obtained when controlling for endogeneity using 2-GMM (columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4) except for Common·Family, which is no longer significant.    Results from 
the Hansen test indicate our chosen instruments are relatively robust, although the 
endogeneity test is rejected at the 10 per cent level.  This would suggest our 2-GMM results 
are the most credible.  
 




To summarise to this point, it would appear that firms generally disclose more information in 
common law countries.  Also CG has an impact on disclosure in both civil and common law 
countries, but the impact is incrementally greater in common law countries.  We find little 
evidence that ownership structure has any significant impact on the disclosure levels after 
controlling for endogeneity.   
 
Next, we test the robustness of the results observed in Tables 3 and 4.  First to consider the 
impact of the sample concentration in Japan and UK, we exclude these countries and re-
estimate the results (tabulated in columns 5-8 of Tables 3 and 4).  Irrespective of the large 
sample size difference, the coefficients’ signs and significance are similar to the estimates 
including all countries for our CG variable, Gov7, suggesting those results are relatively 
robust.  We then exclude countries with the smallest number of observations (Portugal, N=35 
and South Korea, N=28) from our overall sample and re-estimate our models, with similar 
results (not tabulated).   We also exclude firms from the financials (N=1,433) and utilities 
(N=284) sectors and find comparable results (not tabulated).   
 
We also test the robustness of our results to a number of alternative variable definitions (the 
results of which are not tabulated).  First, we use alternative definitions for firm size, i.e. the 
natural log of sales revenue in $US and the natural log of total assets in $US, and results are 
unchanged.  Second we use alternative aggregate CG indices from prior literature in place of 
Gov7; specifically we use Gov24 (Chung, Elder, Kim, 2010) and Gov41 (Aggarwal et al.  
2011)11.  We find the statistical significance of CG is sensitive to these alternative aggregate 
measures of CG in some models, although we believe this is due to Gov24 and Gov41 
including items not expected to influence disclosure in some countries.  To investigate this 
further, we estimate our models using two alternative measures of CG that are focused on 
aspects that could influence disclosure levels in the firm.  The first variable is Board, which 
evaluates board quality; it includes factors such as the board of directors’ independence and 
separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman.  The second variable is Audit, which focuses 
on the roles of the auditor and the audit committee (see Appendix for details on the 
measurement of these variables).  Our results are robust to using Board, although in 2-GMM 
models Audit is not statistically significant.  We also estimate our models using the raw 
                                                           
11 The simple correlation (not tabulated) between Gov7 and these alternative measures of CG is 0.83 or higher. 
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document count variable as the dependent variable, using Poisson regression methods to 
allow for count dependent variables.  The results are comparable to those reported earlier.   
 
To investigate the results obtained for ownership, we collect data on the percentage of closely 
held shares from Worldscope (N=7,581), which incorporates family ownership, director 
ownership and other individuals who hold over 5 per cent of the share capital and re-estimate 
the models.12  We find closely held shares (Closeheld) are negatively associated with the 
level of disclosure (p =0.01).  When variables for legal origin are included, the significance 
level of Closeheld is 10 per cent.  Also the interaction between Closeheld and Common is not 
statistically significant, suggesting the influence of closely held shares on disclosure levels is 
no different in common law countries.  Our results on Gov7 are comparable with those 
previously reported.  These results suggest close ownership leads to secretive behaviour, 
especially where there is weaker investor protection.  We conclude that our results for this 
section are relatively robust and confirm better CG is associated with greater disclosure. 
Furthermore, individual firm-level CG would appear to have greater influence on disclosure 
levels in common law countries.  Results also indicate close ownership can result in 
withholding information from the market. 
 
5 The Timeliness of Price Discovery 
5.1 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the number of observations by country and year, and the mean 
value for the three CG variables for the timeliness of price discovery sample. There are 24 
countries in the sample, where we could obtain data on firm stock prices and earnings release 
dates to calculate the timeliness of price discovery to match the CG data we have for firms 
with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008.  We are unable to obtain data 
for all years for South Korean firms.  The primary sample comprises 35,965 firm-year 
observations relating to 8,471 unique firms. Many observations are for firms in the USA, 
Japan and the UK (68 per cent, 9 per cent and 6 per cent of the sample respectively), the 
implications of which we consider later in our analysis.   
 
XX TABLE 5 XX 
 
                                                           
12 The average level of close shareholding is 29.4% in the document count sample. 
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In this sample, many firms meet the minimum standard of CG disclosure with 72 per cent of 
Gov7 criteria being met on average.  Japan again has the lowest overall CG on average with 
only 40 per cent of governance criteria being satisfied (Gov7 mean = 0.4), whereas Canada 
has the highest (Gov7 mean = 0.87).  Unsurprisingly, since the Sarbanes Oxley Act the USA 
has the highest average audit quality (Audit mean=0.87), compared with the sample average 
of 0.76.  Board quality is lowest in Japan (Board mean = 0.33) perhaps due to the presence of 
insiders on many Japanese boards (Uchida, 2011), compared with the sample average of 0.66.  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the sample composition by legal origin.  In our sample, 81 per cent 
of observations relate to countries of common law legal origin and CG quality for all three 
measures of CG is statistically higher in common law countries (p < 0.001).  Panel C of Table 
5 shows the distribution of industrial sectors in our data using GICS sector definitions.  The 
largest sector is Financials representing 19 per cent of observations, and the smallest is 
Telecommunications, which represents 2 per cent of the sample.13  
 
Table 6, panel A shows the mean values of the firm-level variables (excluding CG, which is 
included in Table 5) in the timeliness of price discovery models by country.  In the left panel 
(Columns 1 – 7) there are mean values for variables included in the base model (N=35,965), 
and in the right panel (columns 8 – 1 0) there are descriptive statistics relating to additional 
ownership variables sourced from OSIRIS (N=21,243).  The timeliness measure (Timeliness 
Deflated) ranges from an average of 0.12 in Portugal and 0.23 in the USA, suggesting the 
USA has less timely price discovery on average than other sample countries.  Although this 
may seem counter-intuitive, it may be due to the composition of the USA sample which 
contains significant variation in terms of firm size.  Indeed the USA has the smallest mean 
firm size (Size) in our sample, see Panel A of Table 6.  Panel B of Table 6 shows the mean 
values of variables by legal origin.  Firms in common law countries are generally less timely 
(Timeliness Deflated), smaller in Size, more highly geared (Leverage) and have more cross-
listings in the USA. For all variables in our study, there is a statistically significant difference 
in the means of the civil law and common law countries (p <0.001).  Panel C shows the mean 
variable values by GICS sector.  We find utilities have the most timely price discovery 
(Timeliness Deflated) perhaps due to regulatory requirements to make additional disclosures 
on a timely basis. Healthcare has the lowest timeliness. 
 
                                                           
13 In sensitivity analysis we exclude the financials and utilities sectors as they are subject to additional disclosure 
requirements in many countries. The conclusions are similar.   
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XX TABLE 6 XX 
 
Correlations (not tabulated) show Board and Audit sub-indices of CG are highly correlated 
with Gov7 (r = 0.87 and r = 0.74 respectively).  Firm size (Size) is negatively correlated with 
Timeliness Deflated (r = -0.36), i.e. larger firms have more timely price discovery, but there 
is a weak negative correlation between firm size (Size) and Gov7 (r = -0.12).  Firms with 
more volatile performance (Volatility) have less timely price discovery (r = 0.44).  For the 
sub-sample where we have ownership data, Family ownership (Family) is negatively 
correlated with block holdings of institutional investors (Instown) (r = -0.11) indicating 
family owned firms are less likely to have a large proportion of institutional ownership.  We 
also find Gov7 is weakly negatively correlated with Instown (r = -0.10) and Family (r = -
0.03), hinting that substitution effects may be at work between ownership structures and other 
CG mechanisms. 
 
5.2 Results from Timeliness of Prices Models 
Table 7 shows the results for models of the relationship between CG, ownership and the 
timeliness of price discovery.  Columns 1 to 4 show results for all countries in our sample.  
We include both OLS and 2-GMM results in our table for comparison purposes.  Recall from 
our hypothesis H2A, we expect more timely price discovery for better-governed firms (i.e. a 
negative coefficient on CG).   
 
XX TABLE 7 XX 
 
Our results show Gov7 is positive and significant, suggesting less timely price discovery for 
firms with better governance (column 1, Table 7).  Therefore rather than a complementary 
relationship between CG, we find evidence to suggest there is a substitution relationship (i.e. 
firms with better CG tend to be more transparent in the sense that price discovery takes 
longer for them).  Although inconsistent with our hypothesis and results for Australia (Beekes 
and Brown, 2006), this result is consistent with results for US companies from prior research 
(e.g. Bushman et al. 2004 find an inverse relationship between earnings timeliness and CG).  
Similarly, when we include the ownership variables, Gov7 is reliably positive and significant 
(column 2, Table 7).  Interestingly, family ownership (Family) is associated with more timely 
price discovery, consistent with evidence which suggests family firms wish to be perceived as 
being forthcoming with information.  Block ownership by institutional investors (Instown) 
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has no significant effect on the timeliness of price discovery.  When controlling for 
endogeneity in 2-GMM estimation, as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, we find comparable 
results.  We note at this point that our instruments appear to be robust from the Hansen’s J-
statistic and the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM diagnostic tests do not raise any undue concern.  
Also, the endogeneity test suggests that endogeneity is not a key issue in these estimations.  
Control variables in these models are as expected: larger firms are associated with more 
timely price discovery, along with firms with good overall performance (Good news).  
However, firms with more volatile performance (Volatility) and greater leverage have less 
timely price discovery.   
 
Turning to the influence of a country’s legal origin on the timeliness of price discovery, we 
include a dummy variable to capture any association with legal origin.  The results are 
reported in Table 8.  Gov7 is positive and statistically significant suggesting better CG is 
associated with more disclosure, although we find no reliable evidence of incrementally 
greater disclosure in common law countries since Common·Gov7 is insignificant (column 1, 
Table 8).  The ownership variables and interactions with the common law dummy variable 
are also insignificant (column 2, Table 8).  Controlling for endogeneity in columns 3 and 4, 
we find Gov7 has comparable results, although the ownership variables are now significant.  
Instown is positive, suggesting lower timeliness of price discovery with institutional 
ownership, although the interaction term Common·Instown is not significant.  The main effect 
for Family is not significant but the interaction term Common·Family is reliably negative, 
indicating more timely price discovery in common law countries when there is greater family 
ownership. 
 
XX TABLE 8 XX 
 
Recall we noted from Table 5 that Japan, UK and USA constitute a relatively large 
proportion of our overall sample.  We exclude observations for these countries and re-
estimate the models. The results are reported in columns 5 to 8 of Tables 7 and 8.  The 
coefficient signs and significance are generally comparable to earlier results, except for the 
ownership variables which are not statistically significant.  Despite the large drop in the 
number of observations included in the estimates, the explanatory power of the models is 
similar.  We conclude that our results for Gov7 are relatively robust to the exclusion of UK, 
Japan, USA from the estimation sample, although the influence of ownership does not appear 
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robust.    We next exclude South Korea, for which we have only N=28 observations, and re-
estimate the results (not tabulated); our conclusions are unaffected.   We also exclude firms 
from the financials (N=6,884) and utilities (N=995) sectors and find comparable results (not 
tabulated). 
 
We next test the robustness of the results to alternative variable definitions.  We use 
alternative measures of firm size: the natural log of Total Assets in $US and the natural log of 
total sales in $US; although the significance of Gov7 and Family is sensitive to this change in 
some models, our broad conclusions are the same.  To test the sensitivity of our results to the 
measure of CG, we use alternative measures of composite CG from the literature in place of 
Gov7: as before we use Gov24 from Chung, Elder Kim (2010) and Gov41 from Aggarwal, et 
al. (2011).  Our conclusions from these estimations are unchanged, although the significance 
of CG and the ownership variable is sensitive to this change in some specifications.  Firstly, 
we re-estimate our results using our sub-indices of CG, Audit and Board (not tabulated).  We 
find comparable results for Audit, but the significance of Board is sometimes sensitive in 
these estimations.  This suggests board quality is less influential for the timeliness of price 
discovery, perhaps due to inadequate board structures or insufficient experience among 
outside directors to monitor senior managers effectively.  To test the sensitivity of our results 
to the definition of ownership, we collect additional data on the percentage of closely held 
shares (Closeheld) from Worldscope, resulting in 26,225 observations.14  We use this variable 
in place of our other ownership variables in models. Although Closeheld is not statistically 
significant in OLS estimations, after controlling for endogeneity we find comparable results 
for Gov7. However, more closely held firms are associated with more timely price discovery.  
The interaction term Common·Closeheld is positive and significant, suggesting that in 
common law countries, price discovery is less timely for firms with more closely held shares.  
 
In summary, our results are broadly comparable; better-governed firms are associated with 
faster price discovery.  Family ownership may actually enhance the timeliness of information 
discovery in prices, but this effect is restricted to common law countries where there is a 
higher level of investor protection.  We find no reliable evidence that institutional ownership 
affects the timeliness of price discovery in our sample.   We do find the extent to which the 
firm is closely held is associated with less timely price discovery in common law countries. 
                                                           





We investigate whether better-governed firms are associated with greater disclosure and more 
timely price discovery.  We investigate these issues using a multi-country sample of firms 
between 2003 and 2008 which enables us to examine results at firm and country levels.  Our 
estimation methods control for potential endogeneity in CG and ownership.  We find better 
governance is associated with a greater number of disclosures, but not more timely price 
discovery.  This would suggest that firms with better CG substitute governance for greater 
transparency, proxied by more timely release of information to the market, or alternatively 
that market participants take longer to process the greater amount of information disclosed by 
better-governed firms to the market place.  With regard to the level of ownership, in some 
estimations, family (institutional) ownership is associated with faster (slower) price 
discovery, although this result is sensitive to the countries included in the estimates.  Firms 
with greater proportions of closely held shares are associated with fewer disclosures and less 
timely price discovery, which is consistent with the view that firms controlled by insiders are 
less willing to release information to outside parties.   
 
In all countries, irrespective of legal origin, we find at the individual firm level, CG positively 
influences the level of firm disclosure, consistent with prior research for Australia (Beekes 
and Brown (2006).  However the effect of CG on disclosure is greater in common law 
countries as expected.  We attribute this finding to better investor protection which 
encourages firms to disclose more information.  With regard to timeliness, we find better CG 
is associated with lower timeliness of price discovery.  This is contrary to prior evidence and 
suggests better-governed firms substitute ‘better’ CG for greater transparency.  We also find 
evidence that closely held shares are associated with less transparency. 
 
Our results contribute to the growing literature on CG and show CG can have a positive 
influence on the level of information available about a firm.  The results relating to the 
association between CG and the timeliness of price discovery are surprising and worthy of 
further investigation.  Future work we have in progress examines the effect of CG and 
ownership on analyst following and the properties of analyst forecasts.  As the results of this 
study show, better-governed firms release more information. Thus a question remains: is this 
information processed effectively by analysts, and if so, how is it reflected in attributes of 
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their forecasts? The answer may shed further light on our results for the timeliness of price 
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Table 1: Document Count Sample Number of Observations and Mean Values for Measures of Corporate Governance 
PANEL A: By country 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance (2003 – 2008) 
 Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Australia 62 63 99 98 96 75 493 6.13 0.60 0.46 0.61 
Belgium 0 12 21 23 19 16 91 1.13 0.49 0.32 0.48 
Canada 175 167 151 164 146 182 985 12.25 0.87 0.73 0.94 
Denmark 18 21 21 21 20 27 128 1.59 0.63 0.45 0.73 
Finland 26 27 29 31 31 31 175 2.18 0.73 0.52 0.83 
France 0 27 31 40 37 63 198 2.46 0.45 0.54 0.43 
Greece 10 19 25 33 31 26 144 1.79 0.54 0.34 0.46 
Hong Kong 47 53 104 102 101 94 501 6.23 0.58 0.64 0.43 
Ireland 6 13 14 16 16 17 82 1.02 0.68 0.63 0.63 
Italy 18 9 22 29 30 37 145 1.80 0.48 0.47 0.43 
Japan 0 429 531 555 514 0 2,029 25.23 0.40 0.42 0.33 
Netherlands 17 26 30 23 9 17 122 1.52 0.62 0.45 0.61 
Norway 18 21 20 21 20 26 126 1.57 0.57 0.45 0.58 
Portugal 0 0 10 8 8 9 35 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.44 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 42 56 98 1.22 0.70 0.76 0.58 
South Korea  0 0 0 0 14 14 28 0.35 0.56 0.52 0.52 
Spain 43 33 48 50 46 44 264 3.28 0.44 0.46 0.35 
Sweden 6 6 37 44 42 48 183 2.28 0.71 0.51 0.88 
UK 184 196 491 471 432 441 2,215 27.54 0.76 0.73 0.68 





PANEL B: By legal origin 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance 
 Legal Origin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Civil law 156 630 825 878 821 358 3,668 45.61 0.47 0.44 0.43 
Common law 474 492 859 851 833 865 4,374 54.39 0.74 0.69 0.70 
All countries 630 1,122 1,684 1,729 1,654 1,223 8,042 100 0.62 0.58 0.58 
 
 
PANEL C: By Global Industry Classification Standard industrial sector 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance 
GICs sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Consumer Discretionary 102 200 325 335 303 218 1,483 18.44 0.60 0.58 0.55 
Consumer Staples 49 94 128 123 112 81 587 7.30 0.61 0.56 0.57 
Energy 38 41 59 65 61 97 361 4.49 0.73 0.67 0.70 
Financials 121 180 297 305 307 223 1,433 17.82 0.61 0.57 0.56 
Health Care 27 44 75 78 76 56 356 4.43 0.65 0.57 0.64 
Industrials 110 226 342 339 332 232 1,581 19.66 0.61 0.58 0.56 
Information Technology 52 119 177 191 189 94 822 10.22 0.59 0.56 0.54 
Materials 77 143 186 198 178 148 930 11.56 0.66 0.59 0.65 
Telecommunication Services 24 32 39 37 41 32 205 2.55 0.63 0.56 0.58 
Utilities 30 43 56 58 55 42 284 3.53 0.62 0.56 0.57 
Total 630 1,122 1,684 1,729 1,654 1,223 8,042 100 0.62 0.58 0.58 
 
Note: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global database.  This table shows the number of 
observations per year and the mean values for our corporate governance variables by country in Panel A, by legal origin in panel B and by Global Industry Classification 
Standard sector in panel C.  The Civil law countries in our sample are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South 
Korea, Spain and Sweden and the Common law countries in our sample are: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore and UK.  Our measures of corporate 
governance are Gov7, Audit and Board.  Gov7 is a measure of corporate governance between 0 and 1 where higher values are associated with ‘better’ corporate governance, 
Audit is a measure of the audit quality between 0 and 1 where higher values are associated with ‘better’ audit quality and Board is a measure of board quality between 0 and 1 
where higher values are associated with ‘better’ board quality.  For further details on the governance measures, see the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Document Count Models 
Panel A: Mean values by Country 
 
Country N Doc Count Ldocs Size Leverage Volatility Goodnews Crosslist N Instown Family 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Australia 493 145.74 4.69 7.97 0.26 0.01 50.30% 8.72% 423 37.50% 0.97% 
Belgium 91 34.44 3.26 8.21 0.29 0.01 40.66% 5.49% 82 21.52% 1.46% 
Canada 985 82.57 4.31 7.64 0.23 0.02 40.30% 47.82% 335 8.56% 3.80% 
Denmark 128 68.45 4.10 7.97 0.29 0.02 56.25% 7.81% 109 16.28% 0.24% 
Finland 175 95.54 4.38 7.53 0.22 0.02 53.71% 9.71% 165 11.02% 3.29% 
France 198 37.55 3.12 8.98 0.25 0.02 39.90% 16.16% 185 16.41% 1.74% 
Greece 144 41.30 3.32 7.36 0.28 0.02 45.83% 11.81% 119 7.34% 14.83% 
Hong Kong 501 30.23 3.23 7.86 0.18 0.02 45.71% 4.19% 238 22.72% 3.80% 
Ireland 82 77.76 3.97 7.75 0.34 0.02 35.37% 37.80% 64 10.28% 2.83% 
Italy 145 14.31 2.50 8.65 0.32 0.01 45.52% 13.79% 135 10.73% 3.11% 
Japan 2,029 45.54 3.74 7.99 0.21 0.02 47.17% 4.53% 810 7.51% 0.55% 
Netherlands 122 28.89 3.07 8.25 0.26 0.01 56.56% 30.33% 87 20.91% 0.06% 
Norway 126 122.21 4.69 7.47 0.25 0.02 46.03% 15.08% 101 17.59% 0.41% 
Portugal 35 84.91 3.88 8.52 0.41 0.01 54.29% 17.14% 35 24.03% 0.06% 
Singapore 98 81.71 4.17 7.53 0.24 0.02 36.73% 2.04% 78 25.10% 2.35% 
South Korea  28 65.71 4.14 9.42 0.28 0.02 53.57% 42.86% 26 11.58% 3.56% 
Spain 264 42.41 3.61 8.45 0.23 0.01 52.65% 12.50% 206 19.39% 4.33% 
Sweden 183 65.43 3.91 8.16 0.25 0.02 45.36% 3.83% 164 11.29% 1.31% 
UK 2,215 133.32 4.40 7.19 0.23 0.02 50.70% 11.06% 1,689 15.29% 4.82% 












Panel B: Mean values by Legal Origin 
Legal Origin N Doc Count Ldocs Size Leverage Volatility Goodnews Crosslist N Instown Family 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Civil law 3,668 50.00 3.68 8.08 0.23 0.02 47.82% 8.37% 2,224 12.31% 2.20% 
Common law 4,374 109.28 4.27 7.47 0.23 0.02 47.14% 18.59% 2,827 18.60% 3.92% 
All countries 8,042 82.24 4.00 7.75 0.23 0.02 47.45% 13.93%  5,051 15.83% 3.16% 
 
Panel C: Mean Values by Global Industry Classification Standard industrial sector 
N Doc Count Ldocs Size Leverage Volatility Goodnews Crosslist N Instown Family 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Consumer Discretionary 1,483 67.91 3.89 7.42 0.23 0.02 40.26% 10.32% 905 16.45% 4.71% 
Consumer Staples 587 88.88 4.03 7.97 0.25 0.01 44.97% 8.86% 339 15.06% 2.94% 
Energy 361 96.73 4.17 8.12 0.22 0.02 58.45% 32.69% 232 13.41% 2.02% 
Financials 1,433 119.17 4.17 8.38 0.23 0.02 48.99% 12.14% 1,011 17.11% 2.95% 
Health Care 356 89.61 4.13 7.30 0.19 0.02 41.29% 24.16% 225 16.89% 1.79% 
Industrials 1,581 66.92 3.93 7.47 0.24 0.02 53.19% 5.12% 999 15.44% 3.33% 
Information Technology 822 65.59 3.89 7.05 0.13 0.02 39.05% 13.87% 442 14.53% 3.68% 
Materials 930 76.78 4.01 7.70 0.24 0.02 49.89% 20.75% 568 17.87% 2.61% 
Telecom. Services 205 84.20 4.08 8.82 0.29 0.02 44.88% 47.80% 140 9.21% 1.30% 
Utilities 284 79.31 3.96 8.85 0.41 0.01 62.32% 17.96% 190 12.99% 1.32% 
All sectors 8,042 82.24 4.00 7.75 0.23 0.02 47.45% 13.93% 5,051 15.83% 3.16% 
 
Note: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global database.  There are 8,042 
observations in the main dataset from nineteen countries.  Due to data availability from OSIRIS, the sample including the percentage of block-holding by 
institutional investors (Instown) and family ownership (Family) is reduced to 5,051 observations.  This table shows the mean values for our variables used in the 
document count models by country in Panel A, by legal origin in panel B and by Global Industry Classification Standard sector in panel C.  The Civil law 
countries in our sample are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain and Sweden and the 
Common law countries in our sample are: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore and UK.  Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 3: The relationship between corporate governance, ownership and document disclosure frequency  
Dependent variable – Ldocs 
  All Countries  Excluding Japan, UK, USA 
Estimation Method: Ex. OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM  OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM 
Column Number: Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gov7 (+) 0.547 0.580 0.467 0.520 0.533 0.534 0.475 0.491 
  (6.73)*** (5.73)*** (3.70)*** (3.40)*** (4.67)*** (3.85)*** (3.00)*** (2.64)*** 
Instown (?)  -0.047  -0.093  -0.085  -0.082 
   (0.66)  (0.95)  (0.98)  (0.70) 
Family (?)  -0.273  -0.018  -0.016  -0.045 
   (1.88)*  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.27) 
Size (+) 0.197 0.219 0.198 0.221 0.162 0.182 0.163 0.181 
  (21.05)*** (19.02)*** (21.10)*** (18.97)*** (12.21)*** (11.08)*** (12.45)*** (11.18)*** 
Leverage (+) 0.289 0.156 0.290 0.155 0.300 0.202 0.299 0.194 
  (4.48)*** (1.96)** (4.51)*** (1.96)* (3.06)*** (1.66)* (3.06)*** (1.59) 
Volatility (+) 9.635 9.428 9.665 9.575 9.228 7.847 9.213 7.967 
  (7.06)*** (5.54)*** (7.10)*** (5.65)*** (4.72)*** (3.17)*** (4.72)*** (3.22)*** 
Goodnews (+) -0.044 -0.067 -0.044 -0.064 -0.031 -0.054 -0.032 -0.049 
  (3.11)*** (3.66)*** (3.10)*** (3.53)*** (1.60) (2.18)** (1.63) (1.99)** 
Crosslist (+) 0.138 0.132 0.141 0.141 0.145 0.141 0.147 0.147 
  (3.27)*** (2.25)** (3.34)*** (2.40)** (2.99)*** (1.97)** (3.02)*** (2.07)** 
Hansen's J p-value    0.92 0.41   0.81 0.48 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value    0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Endogeneity test p-value    0.36 0.08   0.52 0.92 
F-test excluded instr.    385.78*** 88.18***   339.77*** 96.99*** 
F-test  29.82*** 23.69*** 29.91*** 24.03*** 27.64*** 23.41*** 27.74*** 24.07*** 
Adj. R2  0.53 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 
N  8,042 5,051 8,042 5,051 3,798 2,552 3,798 2,552 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two tailed tests 
Notes: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global CG Database.  Results are estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) pooled cross section and time series regression with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity or by using two step Generalised Method of Moments (2-
GMM) estimation methods which are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for endogeneity in corporate governance, as indicated in the column heading. All standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  All models also have year, industry sector, country, country-year and industry sector-year controls included. Variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 4: The impact of legal origin on the relationship between corporate governance and ownership on the level of disclosure 
Dependent variable – Ldocs 
  All countries  Excluding Japan and UK 
 Ex. OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM  OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM 
 Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gov7 (+) 0.412 0.392 0.342 0.214 0.409 0.294 0.399 0.256 
  (3.64)*** (2.73)*** (1.68)* (0.98) (2.45)** (1.64) (1.84)* (1.15) 
Instown  (?)  -0.170  -0.248  -0.207  -0.205 
   (1.45)  (1.24)  (1.50)  (1.02) 
Family (?)  0.226  0.076  0.073  -0.058 
   (1.02)  (0.33)  (0.30)  (0.24) 
Size (+) 0.196 0.218 0.197 0.214 0.162 0.181 0.164 0.180 
  (21.02)*** (18.92)*** (21.11)*** (18.40)*** (12.29)*** (11.11)*** (12.58)*** (11.27)*** 
Leverage (+) 0.284 0.144 0.282 0.153 0.294 0.189 0.291 0.171 
  (4.41)*** (1.82)* (4.38)*** (1.97)** (3.01)*** (1.55) (2.98)*** (1.48) 
Volatility (+) 9.675 9.356 9.629 9.057 9.269 7.871 9.196 7.879 
  (7.10)*** (5.50)*** (7.08)*** (5.44)*** (4.77)*** (3.18)*** (4.75)*** (3.25)*** 
Goodnews (+) -0.044 -0.066 -0.044 -0.065 -0.031 -0.055 -0.032 -0.054 
  (3.09)*** (3.59)*** (3.10)*** (3.51)*** (1.59) (2.22)** (1.65)* (2.17)** 
Crosslist (+) 0.137 0.136 0.138 0.141 0.144 0.140 0.144 0.141 
  (3.27)*** (2.33)** (3.27)*** (2.42)** (2.99)*** (1.98)** (2.98)*** (2.05)** 
Common (+) 0.695 0.597 0.891 0.596 0.754 0.241 0.869 0.545 
  (4.88)*** (3.64)*** (2.85)*** (1.45) (4.14)*** (0.56) (3.05)*** (1.28) 
Common·Gov7 (+) 0.252 0.339 0.319 0.658 0.266 0.613 0.272 0.752 
  (1.54) (1.65)* (1.35) (1.84)* (1.14) (2.13)** (1.03) (1.71)* 
Common·Instown  (?)  0.194  0.171  0.189  0.095 
   (1.30)  (0.72)  (1.09)  (0.39) 
Common·Family (?)  -0.675  -0.197  -0.219  -0.054 
   (2.36)**  (0.71)  (0.70)  (0.17) 
Hansen's J p-value    0.52 0.35   0.58 0.75 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value    0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Endogeneity test p-value    0.64 0.10   0.91 0.57 
F-test excluded instr.    364.73*** 18.65***   322.17*** 10.10*** 
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F test  29.83*** 23.18*** 29.89*** 23.80*** 27.66*** 23.30*** 27.75*** 23.63*** 
Adj. R2  0.53 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62 
N  8,042 5,051 8,042 5,051 3,798 2,552 3,798 2,552 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two-tailed tests 
Notes: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global CG Database.  Results are estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled cross section and time series regression with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity or by using two step Generalised 
Method of Moments (2-GMM) estimation methods which are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for endogeneity in corporate governance, as indicated in the column 
heading. All standard errors are clustered by firm.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  All models also have year, industry sector, country, country-year and industry sector-
year controls included. Variables are defined in the Appendix.   
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Table 5: Timeliness Sample Number of Observations and Mean Values for Measures of Corporate Governance 
PANEL A: By country 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance (2003 – 2008) 
 Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Australia 78 74 115 114 107 80 568 1.58 0.60 0.47 0.61 
Austria 20 18 19 18 18 26 119 0.33 0.55 0.29 0.54 
Belgium 24 19 25 27 26 28 149 0.41 0.47 0.29 0.45 
Canada 178 175 157 167 153 180 1,010 2.81 0.87 0.73 0.94 
Denmark 24 21 21 21 20 27 134 0.37 0.62 0.43 0.72 
Finland 27 27 29 31 31 31 176 0.49 0.73 0.52 0.82 
France 86 74 81 85 83 80 489 1.36 0.44 0.48 0.43 
Germany 84 81 82 86 85 90 508 1.41 0.59 0.42 0.60 
Greece 43 42 41 39 37 32 234 0.65 0.50 0.28 0.43 
Hong Kong 50 56 108 106 104 96 520 1.45 0.58 0.63 0.43 
Ireland 14 15 13 16 16 16 90 0.25 0.67 0.59 0.63 
Italy 62 44 69 70 63 70 378 1.05 0.48 0.48 0.41 
Japan 479 493 565 579 576 653 3,345 9.30 0.40 0.40 0.33 
Netherlands 46 43 42 41 38 35 245 0.68 0.62 0.46 0.61 
New Zealand 13 12 16 15 15 15 86 0.24 0.62 0.53 0.60 
Norway 20 21 20 21 20 26 128 0.36 0.57 0.45 0.58 
Portugal  15 13 14 14 14 16 86 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.35 
Singapore 47 49 53 53 52 59 313 0.87 0.67 0.59 0.60 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 14 14 28 0.08 0.56 0.52 0.52 
Spain 52 36 52 54 49 47 290 0.81 0.45 0.46 0.35 
Sweden 45 44 42 46 45 50 272 0.76 0.69 0.44 0.87 
Switzerland 59 53 56 61 55 56 340 0.95 0.67 0.61 0.63 
UK 181 191 481 471 425 426 2,175 6.05 0.76 0.73 0.68 
USA 4,404 4,154 4,106 4,011 3,660 3,947 24,282 67.52 0.78 0.87 0.72 
All countries 6,051 5,755 6,207 6,146 5,706 6,100 35,965 100 0.72 0.76 0.66 
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PANEL B: By legal origin 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance 
 Legal Origin 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Civil law 1,086 1,029 1,158 1,193 1,174 1,281 6,921 19.24 0.48 0.42 0.44 
Common law 4,965 4,726 5,049 4,953 4,532 4,819 29,044 80.76 0.77 0.84 0.72 
Total 6,051 5,755 6,207 6,146 5,706 6,100 35,965 100.00 0.72 0.76 0.66 
 
PANEL C: By Global Industry Classification Standard industrial sector 
Number of observations Total Sample Mean values for corporate governance 
GICs sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 N % Gov7 Audit Board 
Consumer Discretionary 1,000 935 1,026 1,022 984 999 5,966 16.59 0.70 0.74 0.65 
Consumer Staples 296 289 306 310 296 303 1,800 5.00 0.67 0.70 0.63 
Energy 214 205 229 250 248 333 1,479 4.11 0.76 0.81 0.71 
Financials 1,190 1,107 1,231 1,171 988 1,197 6,884 19.14 0.71 0.75 0.65 
Health Care 695 677 716 727 682 708 4,205 11.69 0.78 0.84 0.72 
Industrials 928 880 989 990 946 980 5,713 15.88 0.69 0.72 0.64 
Information Technology 1,074 1,014 1,012 977 906 908 5,891 16.38 0.75 0.81 0.68 
Materials 380 375 406 411 386 411 2,369 6.59 0.69 0.68 0.64 
Telecommunication Services 114 114 119 111 107 98 663 1.84 0.71 0.72 0.67 
Utilities 160 159 173 177 163 163 995 2.77 0.73 0.76 0.67 
All Sectors 6,051 5,755 6,207 6,146 5,706 6,100 35,965 100.00 0.72 0.76 0.66 
 
Note: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global and USA corporate governance databases.  This 
table shows the number of observations per year and the mean values for our corporate governance variables by country in Panel A, by legal origin in panel B and by Global 
Industry Classification Standard sector in panel C.  The Civil law countries in our sample are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.  Common law countries in our sample are: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, 
New Zealand, UK and USA.  Our measures of corporate governance are Gov7, Audit and Board.  Gov7 is a measure of corporate governance between 0 and 1 where higher 
values are associated with ‘better’ corporate governance, Audit is a measure of the audit quality between 0 and 1 where higher values are associated with ‘better’ audit quality 
and Board is a measure of board quality between 0 and 1 where higher values are associated with ‘better’ board quality.  For further details see the Appendix. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Timeliness Sample 
Panel A: Mean variable values by country 




N Instown Family 
Column No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Australia 568 0.14 7.87 0.26 0.01 49.65% 7.92% 455 36.59% 1.03% 
Austria 119 0.15 7.74 0.28 0.01 50.42% 3.36% 83 8.67% 5.14% 
Belgium 149 0.17 8.02 0.28 0.01 43.62% 4.03% 136 21.89% 1.20% 
Canada 1,010 0.20 7.63 0.22 0.02 40.30% 48.22% 338 8.57% 4.03% 
Denmark 134 0.17 7.89 0.29 0.02 55.22% 7.46% 114 15.95% 0.51% 
Finland 176 0.17 7.50 0.22 0.02 53.98% 9.66% 166 10.93% 3.28% 
France 489 0.14 8.75 0.26 0.02 46.22% 18.40% 450 14.93% 2.24% 
Germany 508 0.18 8.07 0.22 0.02 50.20% 16.93% 421 8.10% 6.16% 
Greece 234 0.19 6.97 0.26 0.02 44.44% 7.69% 183 6.07% 15.82% 
Hong Kong 520 0.17 7.82 0.18 0.02 45.00% 4.04% 248 23.49% 3.84% 
Ireland 90 0.19 7.74 0.35 0.02 41.11% 41.11% 67 10.32% 3.03% 
Italy 378 0.15 8.13 0.31 0.02 45.50% 8.47% 299 16.65% 3.20% 
Japan 3,345 0.13 7.81 0.22 0.02 48.61% 4.13% 1,301 7.41% 0.55% 
Netherlands 245 0.15 8.09 0.26 0.02 53.47% 29.80% 163 21.16% 0.23% 
New Zealand 86 0.13 6.86 0.30 0.01 50.00% 6.98% 72 40.04% 9.82% 
Norway 128 0.22 7.49 0.26 0.02 45.31% 15.63% 103 17.25% 0.40% 
Portugal  86 0.12 7.81 0.43 0.01 47.67% 12.79% 78 21.21% 0.04% 
Singapore 313 0.15 7.32 0.22 0.02 48.56% 4.47% 246 25.48% 1.68% 
South Korea 28 0.16 9.42 0.28 0.02 53.57% 42.86% 26 11.58% 3.56% 
Spain 290 0.13 8.37 0.23 0.01 52.76% 11.38% 225 18.27% 3.98% 
Sweden 272 0.15 8.04 0.24 0.02 47.06% 5.88% 228 11.15% 1.23% 
Switzerland 340 0.16 8.05 0.20 0.02 55.88% 16.47% 262 11.07% 6.44% 
UK 2,175 0.18 7.17 0.24 0.02 50.71% 11.13% 1,657 15.21% 4.98% 
USA 24,282 0.23 5.90 0.54 0.02 45.76% N/A 13,922 6.37% 6.97% 




Panel B: Mean variable values by legal origin 
 
  Obs. Timeliness Deflated Size Leverage Volatility Goodnews Crosslist
* 
Obs. Instown Family 
Column No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Civil law 6,921 0.15 7.94 0.24 0.02 49.02% 8.99% 4,238 11.78% 2.93% 
Common law 29,044 0.22 6.15 0.49 0.02 46.03% 17.89%* 17,005 8.77% 6.43% 
All countries 35,965 0.21 6.50 0.44 0.02 46.61% 12.62% 21,243 9.37% 5.73% 
 
PANEL C: By Global Industry Classification Standard industrial sector 
 
Obs Timeliness Deflated Size Leverage Volatility Goodnews Crosslist
*
 Obs Instown Family 
Column No. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Consumer Discretionary 5,966 0.22 6.53 0.43 0.02 41.85% 9.33% 3,622 10.31% 7.19% 
Consumer Staples 1,800 0.17 7.13 0.40 0.02 48.72% 7.01% 1,067 10.22% 7.15% 
Energy 1,479 0.26 6.98 0.42 0.02 56.66% 30.84% 897 7.74% 4.66% 
Financials 6,884 0.16 6.54 0.63 0.02 44.70% 10.84% 3,905 10.50% 5.15% 
Health Care 4,205 0.27 5.91 0.38 0.03 45.28% 21.47% 2,320 6.84% 4.62% 
Industrials 5,713 0.19 6.53 0.40 0.02 52.20% 5.12% 3,693 10.18% 6.72% 
Information Technology 5,891 0.26 5.89 0.33 0.03 42.32% 15.48% 3,234 7.60% 6.32% 
Materials 2,369 0.20 7.12 0.40 0.02 50.40% 17.06% 1,525 11.58% 3.66% 
Telecommunication Services 663 0.21 7.32 0.48 0.02 45.25% 44.22% 371 8.06% 3.73% 
Utilities 995 0.11 7.95 0.60 0.01 60.30% 16.85% 609 6.74% 1.42% 
All sectors 35,965 0.21 6.50 0.44 0.02 46.61% 12.62% 21,243 9.37% 5.73% 
Notes: The sample includes 35,965 firm-year observations from twenty four countries with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 which are included on 
the ISS Global and USA corporate governance databases.  *The sample for crosslist excludes USA.  Due to data availability from OSIRIS, the sample including the 
percentage of block-holding by institutional investors (Instown) and family ownership (Family) is reduced to 21,243 observations.  This table shows the number of 
observations per year and the mean values for variables in the timeliness models by country in Panel A, by legal origin in panel B and by Global Industry Classification 
Standard sector in panel C.  The Civil law countries in our sample are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.  Common law countries in our sample are: Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Singapore, New Zealand, UK and 




Table 7: The relation between corporate governance, ownership and the timeliness of price discovery 
Dependent variable: Timeliness Deflated 
  All Countries  Excluding Japan, UK, USA 
Estimation Method: Ex. OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM  OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM 
Column Number: Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gov7 (-) 0.038 0.023 0.032 0.024 0.054 0.044 0.041 0.036 
  (5.49)*** (2.68)*** (3.73)*** (2.37)** (4.08)*** (3.05)*** (2.84)*** (2.29)** 
Instown (?)  0.006  0.007  -0.000  0.004 
   (0.76)  (0.76)  (0.00)  (0.33) 
Family (?)  -0.042  -0.022  -0.006  0.002 
   (3.59)***  (1.77)*  (0.33)  (0.10) 
Size (-) -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
  (27.42)*** (20.87)*** (27.08)*** (20.11)*** (12.95)*** (10.51)*** (12.93)*** (10.43)*** 
Leverage (-) 0.082 0.076 0.082 0.077 0.093 0.070 -0.017 -0.017 
  (16.20)*** (11.89)*** (16.21)*** (12.07)*** (6.55)*** (4.43)*** (5.02)*** (4.67)*** 
Volatility (+) 4.545 4.637 4.548 4.635 4.750 4.405 0.092 0.070 
  (35.84)*** (27.37)*** (35.85)*** (27.31)*** (13.10)*** (10.10)*** (6.47)*** (4.40)*** 
Goodnews (-) -0.020 -0.013 -0.020 -0.013 -0.016 -0.018 4.762 4.430 
  (12.33)*** (6.59)*** (12.34)*** (6.57)*** (4.98)*** (4.71)*** (13.13)*** (10.20)*** 
Hansen's J p-value    0.34 0.25   0.12 0.53 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value    0.00 0.00   0.00 0.00 
Endogeneity test p-value    0.24 0.36   0.13 0.60 
F-test excluded instr.    531.08*** 119.33***   521.75*** 84.85*** 
F-test  53.48*** 31.74*** 53.54*** 31.75*** 10.66*** 8.30*** 10.64*** 8.35*** 
Adj. R2  0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.29 
N  35,965 21,243 35,965 21,243 6,163 4,363 6,163 4,363 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two tailed tests 
Notes: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global and USA corporate governance databases.  
Results in columns 1 to 4 are for the full sample of twenty-four countries and results in columns 5 to 8 exclude Japan, UK and USA from the sample.  Results are estimated 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled cross section and time series regression with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity or by using two step 
Generalised Method of Moments (2-GMM) estimation methods which are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for endogeneity in corporate governance, as indicated in 
the column heading. All standard errors are clustered by firm.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  All models also have year, industry sector, country, country-year and 




Table 8: The impact of legal origin on the association between corporate governance, ownership, and the timeliness of price discovery  
Dependent variable – Timeliness Deflated 
  All countries  Excluding Japan, UK, USA 
 Ex. OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM  OLS OLS 2-GMM 2-GMM 
 Sign (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Gov7 (-) 0.035 0.036 0.047 0.048  0.065 0.057 0.057 0.049 
  (2.90)*** (2.63)*** (2.96)*** (2.85)***  (4.26)*** (3.53)*** (3.52)*** (2.95)*** 
Instown  (?)  0.013  0.032   0.004  0.014 
   (0.97)  (2.02)**   (0.28)  (0.92) 
Family (?)  -0.018  -0.017   -0.015  -0.006 
   (0.90)  (0.85)   (0.74)  (0.30) 
Size (-) -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017  -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
  (27.39)*** (20.81)*** (26.70)*** (19.65)***  (12.96)*** (10.52)*** (13.05)*** (10.60)*** 
Leverage (-) 0.082 0.075 0.081 0.076  0.093 0.070 0.092 0.069 
  (16.20)*** (11.84)*** (16.16)*** (11.87)***  (6.56)*** (4.44)*** (6.47)*** (4.39)*** 
Volatility (+) 4.545 4.638 4.564 4.652  4.750 4.409 4.736 4.405 
  (35.84)*** (27.38)*** (36.00)*** (27.40)***  (13.07)*** (10.09)*** (13.06)*** (10.17)*** 
Goodnews (-) -0.020 -0.013 -0.020 -0.013  -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 
  (12.32)*** (6.57)*** (12.32)*** (6.51)***  (4.97)*** (4.69)*** (4.97)*** (4.63)*** 
Common (-) 0.027 0.030 -0.001 0.005  0.042 0.044 0.020 0.023 
  (1.11) (1.23) (0.05) (0.16)  (1.46) (1.31) (0.60) (0.54) 
Common·Gov7 (-) 0.004 -0.016 -0.023 -0.035  -0.028 -0.041 -0.053 -0.057 
  (0.28) (0.95) (1.10) (1.50)  (1.01) (1.17) (1.45) (1.22) 
Common· Instown  (?)  -0.008  -0.012   -0.006  0.030 
   (0.49)  (0.47)   (0.27)  (0.65) 
Common· Family (?)  -0.028  -0.040   0.033  -0.023 
   (1.18)  (1.91)*   (0.67)  (1.03) 
Hansen's J p-value    0.14 0.24    0.23 0.40 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM p-value    0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 
Endogeneity test p-value    0.15 0.19    0.22 0.51 
F-test excluded instr.    173.25*** 39.53***    55.09*** 15.29*** 
F test  53.26*** 31.45*** 53.36*** 31.47***  10.72*** 8.52*** 10.69*** 8.64*** 
Adj. R2  0.32 0.31 0.32 0.31  0.32 0.29 0.32 0.29 
N  35,965 21,243 35,965 21,243  6,163 4,363 6,163 4,363 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 two tailed tests 
Notes: The sample comprises firms with year ends between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2008 covered by the ISS Global and USA corporate governance databases.  
Results in columns 1 to 4 are for all countries and results in columns 5 to 8 exclude Japan, UK and USA.  Results are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) pooled 
cross section and time series regression with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity or by using two step Generalised Method of Moments (2-GMM) 
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estimation methods which are robust to heteroskedasticity and control for endogeneity in corporate governance, as indicated in the column heading. All standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  All models also have year, industry sector, country, country-year and industry sector-year controls included.  
Variables are defined in the Appendix.   
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APPENDIX A: Firm Level Corporate Governance  
This table shows the CG characteristics included in our measures of corporate governance (Gov7, Audit and Board).  Sub categories for elements of corporate 
governance (board and audit) have also been identified below. 
Table A1: ISS Governance Variable Definitions 
Mean values for components of Gov7 
Documents sample 
N=8,042 
Timeliness of Prices sample 
N= 35,965 
1 Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors .354 .733 
2 Size of board of directors is greater than 5 but not more than 15 members .870 .880 
3 The CEO and chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified .679 .620 
4 Board members are elected annually .406 .424 
5 Audit committee composed solely of independent outsiders .443 .741 
6 Auditors were ratified at the most recent annual meeting .637 .683 
7  Single class, common (not dual class capital structure) .939 .939 
Overall Index: Gov7  .618 .717 
  
Mean values for components of Audit   
1 Audit committee composed solely of independent outsiders .443 .741 
2 Auditors were ratified at the most recent annual meeting .637 .683 
3 Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors .648 .855 
Overall Index: Audit .576 .760 
  
Mean values for components of Board   
1 Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors .354 .733 
2 Size of board of directors is greater than 5 but not more than 15 members .870 .880 
3 The CEO and chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified .679 .620 
4 Board members are elected annually .406 .424 
 Overall Index: Board  .577 .664 
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APPENDIX B: Variable Definitions 
Variable Acronym Description & Sources of information 
Measures of Disclosure and Transparency:  
Document Count Doc Count 
Number of documents released by the firm measured on an annual basis ending 14 days after the 
release of the firm’s Earnings Per Share for the year (Australian Stock Exchange for Australia, 
NYSE Euronext for Belgium, France, Netherlands and Portugal, SEDAR for Canada, Nasdaq 
OMX for Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Athens Exchange for Greece, Hong Kong Exchange for 
Hong Kong, Irish Stock Exchange for Ireland, Borsa Italia for Italy, Timely Disclosure Network of 
Tokyo Stock Exchange for Japan, Korea exchange for Korea, OSLO Bors for Norway, Singapore 
Exchange for Singapore, Comison Nacional Del Mercado de Valores for Spain, Perfect 
Information for UK) 
Log of Document Count Ldocs Natural logarithm (log) of Doc Count.   
Release date ReleaseDate Earliest annual earnings release date meeting the criteria: > 15 days and < 180 days after balance 
sheet date used in the calculation of timeliness of price discovery and document count 
(Bloomberg, Compustat, Compustat Global, I/B/E/S, Reuters, Worldscope)  
Timeliness of price discovery Timeliness The timeliness metric, measured as the average daily absolute difference between the log of the 
market-adjusted share price that day and the log of market-adjusted share price 14 trading days 
after the release of the firm’s Earnings Per Share for the year. (CRSP, Datastream) 
Timeliness deflated Timeliness Deflated The timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the 365 day 
period used to calculate the share’s timeliness metric (CRSP, Datastream) 
Measure of Corporate Governance: (For further details of measures see Appendix A) 
CG Index Gov7 Aggregate Measure of Corporate Governance (Risk Metrics) between 0 and 1 where 1 represents 
better governance 
Audit Index Audit Measure of Audit Quality (Risk Metrics) between 0 and 1 where 1 represents better governance 
Board Index Board Measure of Board Quality (Risk Metrics) between 0 and 1 where 1 represents better governance 
Firm Level Control Variables: 
Firm Size Size Natural log of the firm’s market value of equity at time t in $US. (CRSP, Worldscope) 
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Good news Goodnews Dummy variable with a value of one if the market adjusted return over the 365 days ended 10 days 
after the release date is positive; zero otherwise. 
Leverage Leverage Total Debtt/Total Total Assetst [Compustat items: lt/at and Worldscope items: 
WS.TotalAssets/WS.TotalCommonEquity].  (Compustat, Worldscope) 
Cross-Listing Crosslist Dummy variable with a value of one if firm is cross-listed on a USA stock exchange using a level 
II or level III American Depository Receipt; and zero otherwise. (Bank of New York; US stock 
exchanges, Securities and Exchange Commission) 
Volatility Volatility Volatility calculated from daily log returns in the 90 days ending the day before we observe the 
first price for the timeliness metric.  (CRSP, Datastream) 
Closely Held Closeheld A measure of ownership concentration based on the fraction of shares which are closely held 
[Worldscope Item: WS.CloselyHeldSharesPct] (Worldscope) 
Family ownership Family Percentage of shares held by family members in the firm (OSIRIS) 
Institutional Block holder Instown Percentage of blockholding by institutional investors (OSIRIS) 
Country Level Control Variable: 
Legal Origin Common A dummy variable coded 1 for countries with common law legal origins, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
